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ABSTRACT
The bitcoin peer-to-peer network has drawn significant at-
tention from researchers, but so far has mostly focused on
publicly visible portions of the network, i.e., publicly reach-
able peers. This mostly ignores the hidden parts of the net-
work: unreachable Bitcoin peers behind NATs and firewalls.
In this paper, we characterize Bitcoin peers that might be be-
hind NATs or firewalls from different perspectives. Using a
special-purpose measurement tool we conduct a large scale
measurement study of the Bitcoin network, and discover sev-
eral previously unreported usage patterns: a small number of
peers are involved in the propagation of 89% of all bitcoin
transactions, public cloud services are being used for Bitcoin
network probing and crawling, a large amount of transac-
tions are generated from only two mobile applications. We
also empirically evaluate a method that uses timing informa-
tion to re-identify the peer that created a transaction against
unreachable peers. We find this method very accurate for
peers that use the latest version of the Bitcoin Core client.
1. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [13] is a cryptocurrency and a peer-to-peer net-
work. The explosion in its popularity is fueled in large part
by its decentralized nature, low transaction fees, and ease in
participating. A whole Bitcoin ecosystem, the core of which
is the Bitcoin network, exists today. Understanding its prop-
erties and usage patterns of its participants can give insights
into improving the Bitcoin network, as well as the ecosys-
tem.
Known research on the Bitcoin network has mostly fo-
cused on the publicly visible part of the network, i.e., pub-
licly reachable peers, and ignored the hidden part – clients
behind NATs and firewalls that do not allow inbound con-
nections [3, 6, 7, 12, 14]. Nonetheless, gathering statistics on
such peers is equally, if not even more important, since the
number of such peers is estimated to be to order of magni-
tude larger than the number of reachable peers. In this paper
we conduct a large scale measurement to collect different
statistics and analyze the usage patterns of unreachable Bit-
coin peers that might hide behind NAT or firewalls. To fa-
cilitate our measurement, we designed and implemented an
open-source measurement tool that call we bcclient, which
can serve as a Bitcoin node but with extended features to
aid in collecting specific connection and transaction infor-
mation. We conduct a measurement study using bcclient
using 102 Bitcoin nodes, which were distributed over 14
geographical regions spanning all continents, in the Bitcoin
main network for seven days, and collected information on
about 3 M connections and 2.5 M unique transactions. These
connections are generated from about 190 K IPv4 IPs, and
we used bcclient to discover that 87% of these IPs can be
associated with unreachable peers. Our further analysis on
collected data suggests:
• Bitcoin unreachable peers appear to be centralized in
terms of Internet routing and transaction propagation:
16% of these peers are hosted in only 5 Autonomous
Systems (which constitues only 0.07% of all observed
ASes), and 50 unreachable peers are involved in propa-
gation of 43% of transactions.
• About 80% of unreachable peers are associated with
two mobile Bitcoin applications, which contribute to
61% of unique transactions and 20% of connections.
• A large fraction of connections came from IPs in pub-
lic clouds; a considerable amount of these connections
might be used for Bitcoin network probing and crawl-
ing.
Inspired by our measurement results, we further exercised
bcclient and an experimental framework to empirically eval-
uate a variation of a known method that uses timing informa-
tion to re-identify the peer that created a transaction against
unreachable peers. This method can be useful to further en-
rich the collected dataset with valuable statistics, such as
number transaction generated by each country. In our exper-
iments we were able to re-identify every second transaction
generated by us with the latest at the time of writing version
of Bitcoin Core software (v0.14.1). We observed negligi-
ble false positive rates. We have made the source code for
bcclient publicly available to facilitate future research.
Roadmap: We start by providing the necessary background
to understand Bitcoin peer-to-peer network and message prop-
agation rules in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our
custom-built Bitcoin software, describe our large scale ex-
periments, and present statistics on Bitcoin clients. In Sec-
tion 4, we empirically evaluate our peer triage method. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.
2. BACKGROUND
Bitcoin P2P network. Bitcoin is a digital decentralized cur-
rency that relies on cryptography and a peer-to-peer net-
work for double-spending prevention instead of a trusted
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third party. Bitcoin users can pay each other by creating
cryptographically signed transactions and broadcasting them
in the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network. In order to facilitate
transaction propagation the network implements a simple
gossip protocol: every peer that received a message forwards
it to its neighbors.
The core of the Bitcoin network is a set of about 7000
servers with public IP addresses operated by volunteers and
companies. The network is open and anybody can run a
Bitcoin server and contribute with bandwidth and computa-
tional resources. Bitcoin users (often behind firewalls and/or
NAT’s) that do not allow inbound connection access the net-
work, send transactions, and learn about transactions of oth-
ers through these servers. The list of servers is publicly
available and the default behavior for a server is to accept up
to 117 inbound connections on TCP port 8333. The default
behaviour for a Bitcoin client is to maintain connections to
8 different servers. After Bitcoin peers establish a TCP con-
nection, they complete a handshake protocol by exchanging
VERSION messages, containing among other fields the soft-
ware version/name.
Transaction forwarding. A common transaction consists of
the sender’s and recipient’s Bitcoin addresses, the sender’s
public key and the signature. This makes the transaction
pseudonymous as there is not any identifying information
besides a randomly looking public key/address of the user
who generated it. One possible way to identify the sender
though is to monitor the network traffic, and to look at the IP
address from where the transaction was first sent. In order to
make such traffic analysis harder and improve users’ privacy,
the Bitcoin protocol defines special rules when forwarding a
transaction. The goal of these rules is to make a transac-
tion generated by a user indistinguishable from transactions
generated by others.
First, according to the Bitcoin reference implementation
whenever a Bitcoin peer (either a client or a server) receives
a transaction from one of its neighbors, it broadcasts it fur-
ther to the rest of its neighbors. In this way the peer’s own
transactions get mixed with the ones it relays.
Second, when a peer generates or receives a new transac-
tion it does not relay it immediately to its neighbors. Instead
it chooses and assigns a random exponentially distributed
delay for each of its neighbors; the actual transmissions oc-
cur when the corresponding delays expire. This impedes
timing analysis for an attacker. The mean of exponential dis-
tribution is different for inbound (5 seconds) and outbound
(2.5 seconds) connections. The random exponentially dis-
tributed delays were introduced in the most recent (at the
time of writing) version of Bitcoin reference implementation
and previous research [8, 10] did not take this modification
into account.
Bitcoin Testnet. In order to facilitate testing of new fea-
tures, the Bitcoin community runs a small separate testing
network called Testnet with an independent Blockchain. At
the time of submission Testnet consisted of about 250 nodes
with public IP addresses. By analogy we call the actual Bit-
coin network Mainnet.
3. MEASUREMENTS
3.1 Methodology and dataset
Most of the existing research on the Bitcoin P2P network
focuses on its backbone: the servers with public IP addresses.
Such research is facilitated by the fact that one can readily
connect to the servers and start collecting the data. In this pa-
per we go one step deeper and try to collect data on the less
visible (but nonetheless large) part of the Bitcoin ecosystem:
clients behind NATs and firewalls that do not accept incom-
ing connections. We refer to them as unreachable peers.
During our measurement we injected more than 100 Bitcoin
servers with public IPs distributed over the globe into the
network and were collecting data on incoming connections.
We were mostly interested in the following:
• The number of incoming connections over time and
number of unique IP addresses. We use these figures
to estimate the number of Bitcoin clients behind NATs
and firewalls.
• Location and Autonomous Systems of the discovered
IP addresses. This information can be used to better
understand which countries use Bitcoin the most and
whether Bitcoin clients are centralized in terms of In-
ternet routing.
• Type of software used by Bitcoin clients. This can give
us some insights on whether Bitcoin clients use smart-
phones to access the network, and whether clients ac-
cess Bitcoin through Tor.
• Volume and properties of transactions generated by clients
which can be used to infer Bitcoin clients usage pat-
terns.
Bcclient. In order to facilitate our measurements we devel-
oped a special-purpose measurement tool, called bcclient,
using libbitcoin library [4]. In a nutshell, bcclient is a cus-
tomized, lightweight Bitcoin software that can either run as
Bitcoin full node or client, while offering extended function-
ality such as (1) recording specified events of users’ interest
with precise timestamp, (2) establishing several parallel con-
nections to a given Bitcoin node, (3) running as a full node
without downloading any part of Blockchain, and more. Bc-
client was optimized for memory and storage usage, and for
processing huge volumes of data, which make it suitable for
conducting large-scale and long-term measurement experi-
ments in the main Bitcoin network. Bcclient also includes
an analysis engine that contains a set of tools for analyzing
data. The code of bcclient was released publicly to facilitate
future research1.
Data collection. For our data collection we set up a total of
102 AWS EC2 servers running in diverse networks around
the world, as shown in Figure 1 [11]. More specifically, we
set up servers in each of the availability zones in each AWS
EC2 region (that correspond to different geographical loca-
tions). On each of the EC2 servers we were running an in-
stance of bcclient. We were logging detailed information on
1https://github.com/ivanpustogarov/bcclient
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Figure 1: Number of measurement nodes in different loca-
tions.
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Figure 2: Change over time in different types of IPs that our
nodes have seen. Each point on X-axis represents a 6-hour
period.
inbound connections from IPv4 addresses such as connec-
tion IP, timing, transaction information, etc. We periodically
collected logs from all bcclient instances, and extracted and
deduplicated source IP addresses of inbound connections.
During our study we were interested primarily in clients
behind NATs and firewalls, and thus for each extracted IP
address we checked if we were able to establish a reverse
connection back to the client. We sent a TCP SYN probe to
its port 8333 (Bitcoin default), tried to complete the Bitcoin
handshake protocol if the port was open, and recorded the
connection result, i,e., success or fail.
We have run the measurement three times in March and
May 2017. In this paper, we use the 60 G of data collected
from the latest 168-hour measurement from May 10, 2017
to May 17, 2017.
Ethical considerations. To avoid adding burden on the peers
being scanned, we only tried to establish a reverse connec-
tion to an IP once in every 6 hours, and would close a con-
nection immediately after the connection was established
successfully. We used a special version string in bcclient
so operators of Bitcoin public peers could find and contact
us if they did not want to be probed.
Overview of dataset. During our experiments we observed
a total of 2,956,515 inbound connections from 189,204 unique
source IP addresses; for 99.6% of these connections, we had
the timing information: both their opening times and closing
times in our logs. We say such connections are completed
Our measurement nodes have received a total of 2,490,042
unique transactions from 4,516 IPs. A transaction might be
relayed to our nodes multiple times by different peers; we
refer to each transaction receive event as propagation. We
saw 83,878,269 propagations.
3.2 Characterizing Bitcoin clients
Reachable vs. unreachable. We observed that most of the
incoming connection come from peers that do not accept in-
coming connections (i.e. unreachable peers).
We extracted a total of 189,204 unique source IP addresses
(IPv4) from the completed connections and categorized them
into groups based on whether they responded to our probes.
Unreachable IPs. We say an IP address is unreachable if it
fails to respond to any of our TCP probes during the mea-
surement. We found that 86.8% of the collected IPs are un-
reachable. We mainly focus on unreachable IPs in our anal-
ysis, but also report on statistics about other types of IPs for
comparison purposes in some cases.
Reachable IPs. We say that an IP address is reachable if
we were able to successfully establish a TCP connection at
port 8333 back to such IP address. We found only 13.2%
of IPs to be reachable under this definition. We further split
reachable peers into those that successfully completed the
Bitcoin handshake protocol (we call them available) and
those that did not (we call them unavailable). We found only
1,587 (0.8%) IPs successfully completed the handshake. We
further checked them against the IPs of public Bitcoin nodes
provided by [5], and found that 1,073 of available IPs belong
to the set of public Bitcoin servers. Table 3 further shows
the breakdown of number of connections, transactions, and
propagations from different type of IP addresses.
Remark. It is possible for peers to use a non-default port in
which case we would mark them as unreachable.
Estimating number of clients. Figure 2 shows how the
number of reachable and unreachable IPs changed over time.
At the beginning, the number of unreachable peers gradu-
ally increases; this is due to the fact our Bitcoin servers were
new to the network and Bitcoin clients were learning their IP
addresses over time. After 78 hours the number of unreach-
able peers become relatively stable with the average about
10K peers over 6 hours periods. This can be extrapolated
to estimate the total number of Bitcoin peers behind NATs
and firewalls. Given that an unreachable client establishes
3.5 parallel connections to the network on the average (see
below) and that there were 5,540 Bitcoin servers with IPv4
address on the average during our experiment, we estimate
the number of unreachable clients to be at least 155,000 at
any given 6-hours time interval.
Remark. Note that this number assumes that there is one-
to-one correspondence between an IP address and a client.
Different clients however can share the same NAT address,
and the real number of unreachable clients might be bigger.
An unreachable or unavailable IP could be used as a frontend
IP, which is for the gateway of a network, or the frontend of
a cluster of peers.
Client version. We extracted a total of 534 unique client
version strings from collected connections, and found that
the most popular three Bitcoin client software across all IPs
are BitcoinWallet, Breadwallet, and Bitcore, which are as-
sociated with 59.9%, 20.0%, and 6.9% of all IPs respec-
tively. Unreachable and unavailable IPs are mostly asso-
ciated with version strings “Bitcoin Wallet” or “breadwal-
Type # IP # Conn
0 164,198 (86.8) 936,845 (31.8)
1 23,419 (12.4) 1,095,445 (37.2)
2 1,587 (0.8) 911,173 (31.0)
Total 189,204 (100) 2,943,463 (100)
Type # Prop # TX
0 40,071,909 (47.8) 2,409,087
1 8,987,300 (10.7) 8,987,300
2 34,819,060 (41.5) 2,354,397
Total 83,878,269 (100) 2,490,042
Table 3: An overview of dataset. “Conn”,“TX” and “Prop”
stand for connection, unique transaction ID, and propaga-
tion, respectively. Type 0, 1, 2 correspond to unreachable,
unavailable, available IPs, respectively. Number in paren-
thesis is the percentage of the total number in the last row.
let”. We looked at the their source code and found that Bit-
coinWallet establishes 3 parallel connections to the network;
Breadwallet establishes either 4 or 6 parallel connections de-
pending on the amount of RAM on the device.
Available IPs are mostly associated with version strings
“Satoshi” or “BitcoinUnlimited”. We also found 17,144 un-
reachable IPs (19,813 of all IPs) have sent empty version
strings. Note that we saw 13% of IPs were associated with
multiple version strings which suggests that these are differ-
ent users behind the same NAT address.
We found many users with outdated versions of these apps:
only 48.3% of BitcoinWallet and 79.4% of Breadwallet clients
are using the latest releases. Surprisingly, 98.9% of Bitcore
clients uses outdated versions of client software.
Centralization of Bitcoin clients. We checked geolocation
(i.e., country) and Autonomous Systems (ASes) of all the
collected IPs using a tool called pyasn [1]. We observed
that Bitcoin peers are highly centralized in terms of Internet
routing [2] and transaction propagation.
(1) Peers location. The observed connections coming from
7,070 distinct ASes that span all countries. The country
with most IPs is United States, which has 24.2% of col-
lected IPs, followed by Germany (7.3%), Canada (5.5%),
Russia (4.9%), and United Kingdom (4.7%).
(2) Autonomous systems. We found that just 5 ASes (which
constitues only 0.07% of all observed ASes) host as much as
16.0% of the unreachable peers; these top 5 ASes are asso-
ciated with T-Mobile, Comcast, Verizon, ATT, and Rogers
which suggests that associated peers might run on mobile
devices. Furthemore 100 ASes (which constitues only 1.4%
of all observed ASes) host as much as 60.1% of oberved IPs.
We also analyzed how active each AS was. We found that
63.5% of completed connections were generated from only
10 ASes. Furthermore we found that near 99% of the ASes
are only associated with a small number of connections –
each of these ASes generated less than 0.1% of completed
connections. For connections from unreachable IPs the re-
sult is similar: 33% of them are from 10 ASes.
(3) Transaction propagation. We observed that a small
number of IPs are associated with most of the transaction
propagations. More specifically, 100 IPs are associated with
89% of all the propagations; and 50 unreachable IPs are in-
volved in 43% of all the propagations. These IPs could be-
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Figure 4: CDF of durations of connections. A connection
with “0” duration means its duration is less than one second.
X axis is truncated at 100.
come the “bottleneck” of Bitcoin networks, i.e., taking down
one of these IPs can affect propagation of a considerably
large number of transactions. Inspecting the top ten IPs in
terms of relayed transactions manually, five of them are pub-
lic Bitcoin nodes; however, the other IPs seems not be fron-
tends of services or gateways of networks. This leaves why
they involved in so many transactions an open question and
we are in process of inspecting it.
Remark. Centralization in Bitcoin peers might cause secu-
rity and privacy issues [2]. For example, most of unreach-
able peers are associated to two mobile Bitcoin applications,
which means that security of a large number of transaction
is in hands of just two companies.
3.3 Understanding usage patterns.
Connection duration. We found that a large number of in-
coming connections were short-lived connections; we also
discovered peers performing crawling and probing for Bit-
coin network by establishing connections with very small
duration.
We first examined the duration of completed connections
for all IPs; the median was only 1.3 seconds; 93.9% of con-
nections were less than 60 seconds; and 34.6% of the con-
nections had duration less than 1 second. Only about 0.5%
of completed connections lasted for more than 1 hour and
we found a large fraction of them came from a service called
BitcoinRussia. We compared durations for different types of
connections. As shown in Figure 4, connections from un-
reachable IPs have higher percentage of short-live connec-
tions, e.g., the median connection duration from such IPs is
0.5 seconds and more than 70% of the connection durations
are less than 1 second.
We examined connections with very small duration: we
call a connection ephemeral if its duration is less than 0.5
second. A large portion (48.3%) of connections from un-
reachable IPs are ephemeral. These connections account
for 59.4% of all ephemeral connections (760,948 in total).
Unavailable IPs contribute 34.7% of all ephemeral connec-
tions. We checked the client version strings in the ephemeral
connections from unreachable IPs and found 49% of them
are “breadwallet” or “Bitcoin Wallet”, which indicates these
connections might issued by two mobile Bitcoin applica-
tions: breadwallet and Bitcoin Wallet. We will show more
Type Service Client version # conn %
1 BitcoinRussia bt-russia.ru:0.0.1f 338,399 11.5
2 Hetzner bitnodes.21.co:0.1 222,594 7.6
1 Linnode 8btc.com:1.0 194,285 6.5
1 DigitalOcean Snoopy:0.2.1 191,228 6.5
0 Google bitcoin-seeder:0.01 53,843 1.8
1 DigitalOcean bitcoin-seeder:0.01 53,592 1.8
2 Amazon bitcoin-seeder:0.01 52,491 1.8
2 Amazon bitcoin-seeder:0.01 52,312 1.8
0 Amazon bitcoin-seeder:0.01 52,267 1.8
2 Amazon bitcoin-seeder:0.01 52,078 1.8
Table 5: Top 10 IPs based on number of associated connec-
tions per IP. Type 0, 1, 2 correspond to unreachable, unavail-
able, available IPs, respectively. Percentages are the fraction
of the total number of completed connections.
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Figure 6: CDF of the total number connections from a given
IP.
analysis results on these two applications in later section.
For the ephemeral connections from unavailable IPs, 188,536
out of 264,313 (or 71%) connections, are associated with
two client version strings: “Snoopy” or “bitcoin-seeder”.
Note that Snoopy or bitcoin-seeder are tools for perform-
ing crawling and probing for Bitcoin network. The client
version strings suggest all of these clients might be used for
performing Bitcoin network crawling or probing. More sur-
prisingly, 96% of these suspicious probing connections from
unavailable IPs, which is 6.1% of all completed connections,
came from 4 IPs in two public clouds: three IPs are in Dig-
italOcean and one IP in AWS EC2. Actually, almost all the
probing connections originated from clouds were from only
one unavailable IP in DigitalOcean, and some Bitcoin de-
velopers already suspected that this IP was for conducting
unknown attacks against Bitcoin network.
Connection frequency. Next, we examine how many con-
nections each unreachable peer made during the measure-
ment period. We found about 54% of unreachable IPs only
made one connection, 95% made less than 10, and 99%
made less than 50, while unavailable IPs have a very similar
long-tailed distribution (see Figure 6). In contrast, available
IPs tend to make more connections on average: only 37%
made one connection, while about 9% of them made more
than 100 connections and 2% made more than 500 connec-
tions. Some unreachable or unavailable IPs have made a
large number of connections, as shown in Table 5. As we
can see from Table 5, seven out of ten IPs belong to public
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Figure 7: CDF of number of IPs (left) and number of coun-
tries (right) that involve in the propagation of a given trans-
actions.
clouds.
Transaction characteristics. As shown in Figure 7, a prop-
agation could be relayed by as many as 211 IPs. The IPs that
are involved with a given propagation could be distributed
across ASes and countries. For example, 1% of propaga-
tions are associated with IPs from more than 14 countries.
We further found propagations could be relayed by different
types of peers: only 5.3% of the propagations are relayed by
IPs of the same type, while 75.4% are relayed by a mix of
unreachable, unavailable, and available IPs.
Another observation is that propagations are usually sent
over long-live connections, e.g, 99.9% of the propagations
were sent over the connections the durations of which were
longer than 100 seconds. We grouped propagations based on
source IP types and found the observations still hold true for
different groups of propagations. Only 64 transactions were
sent over ephemeral connections.
Characterizing different types of clients In this section,
we focus on different types of peers: (1) mobile peers, which
are the peers whose version strings contain “breadwallet” or
“Bitcoin Wallet”, (2) probe peers, which are whose version
strings contain “Snoopy” or “bitcoin-seeder”, and (3) tor
peers, which are the peers that also serve as Tor exit nodes
or relay nodes. They represent different types of clients.
As shown in Table 8, mobile peers are associated with
131,610 of unreachable IPs, which is 80% of unreachable
IPs. These IPs contributed to about 20% of all connections,
most of which were short-lived connections (less than 0.5
seconds). We saw only 1.2% of propagations sent from these
IPs; however, these propagations correspond to 61% of unique
transaction IDs. On the average, five transactions were sent
over a connection. One possible explanation for this phe-
nomena is that these peers were configured not to forwarding
transactions.
We observed a small number of IPs that we also identified
as either Tor exit or Tor relay nodes. Similar to mobile peers,
they are involved in less than 1% of propagations but have
sent over 41% of transactions. Compared to other types of
peers, such tor peers have relatively longer connection du-
rations: the median duration of tor peers, probe peers, and
mobile peers are 2.1, 1.2, and 0.4, respectively
No probe peers from available IPs have sent any transac-
tions but generated a large number of connections.
Limitation and discussion. We didn’t verify if a transac-
tion is valid or invalid. Doing so requires a parser for Bitcoin
blockchain information, and we are working on such parser
as part of bcclient analysis engine.
Mobile Probe Tor
Unreachable Unavailable Available Unreachable Unavailable Available Unreachable Unavailable Available
#IP 131,610 (69.6) 16,862 (8.9) 210 (0.11) 12 (0.01) 38 (0.02) 490 (0.26) 171 (0.09) 295 (0.16) 14 (0.01)
#Conn 506,921 (17) 67,356 (2.3) 2,165 (0.07) 97,627 (3.3) 323,885 (11.0) 567,069 (19.3) 2,069 (0.07) 5,819 (0.2) 137
#EphConn 314,394 (10.7) 39,724 (1.4) 1,422 (0.05) 195 (0.01) 188,536 (6.4) 1,011 (0.03) 66 300 (0.01) 71
#Prop 1,008,567 (1.2) 497,848 (0.6) 386,557 (0.5) 41,009 (0.05) 154,393 (0.18) 0 219,261 (0.26) 533,865 (0.64) 46,753 (0.06)
#TX 1,518,206 (61.0) 626,736 (25.2) 679,264 (27.3) 41,283 (1.7) 168,589 (6.7) 0 255,699 (10.3) 717,077 (28.9) 61,112 (2.5)
Table 8: A breakdown of IP, connections and transactions for different types of peers. “IP”, “Conn”, “EphCOnn”, “Prop”, and
“TX” stand for connection, unique IP addresses, connections, ephemeral connections, propagations, and unique transaction
ID respectively. Number in parenthesis is the percentage of the total number of all IPs/connections/propagations /unique
transactions IDs, depending on statistics type.
4. ON FURTHER ENRICHING
THE DATASET
In the previous section, we observed that a single trans-
action can be forwarded by as many as 151 different IP ad-
dresses (excluding IPs of publicly known full Bitcoin nodes)
from a wide range of countries which makes extracting per-
country transaction origin statistics problematic: it would re-
quire one to distinguish between the peer that actually cre-
ated the transaction (originator) from the rest (i.e. peers that
merely relayed it, we call such peers relays). This problem
is well-suited for timing analysis used in [15] for inferring
Bitcoin network topology of publicly reachable peers. We
are working on implementing the timing analysis approach
for unreachable clients as a part of the analysis engine of bc-
client. As a preliminary step, we want to understand how
efficient this method would be for unreachable peers, and
design experiments to evaluate it. We find this method to be
quite efficient and reliable.
To better explain the problem, consider a simple example
in Figure 9 with two peers C and C′, that connect to the Bit-
coin network as regular unreachable clients; C is connected
to one of our monitoring nodes A (which is a public Bitcoin
peer but doesn’t connect to any other peers). Assume C and
C′ generate transactions tx and tx′ both of which will be de-
livered to A throughC. Node A wants to distinguish transac-
tion tx (for which C is true originator) from tx′ (for which C
is a relay). To do this we introduce additional listener node
L that is connected and listens to the publicly known set of
Bitcoin servers and use the following criteria to distinguish
between these two cases: If node A receives tx before L, we
conclude that C is the originator for tx, and a relay other-
wise.
Experiments in the Testnet. We first evaluate true-positive
rate of this method i.e. the chance of successfully identify-
ing C as the originator of tx, by carrying out experiments in
the Bitcoin Testnet. For all the experiments, C was running
Bitcoin core software version v0.14.1. In total we conducted
21 different experiments in which we sent 8400 transactions
from node C. We moved nodes A and C across 14 different
geographical regions (see Section 3) and used transactions
of different sizes (i.e., the number of receiver addresses in
the transaction, chosen from 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100) in or-
der to estimate how these factors affect the efficacy of our
timing analysis. We found that the true-positive rates varied
from experiment to experiment (from 20% to 60%), but on
the average was consistent across different regions and dif-
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Figure 9: Distinguishing transaction true originator
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Figure 10: True positive rate for different regions.
ferent transaction sizes. The resulting true positives rates for
each of the 14 geographical regions are shown in Figure 10
with the average 45.43% over all regions.
To estimate the false-positive rate, we set up client C and
monitoring node A in the same availability zone in us-east-1
region. We count the number of transactions forwarded by
nodeC that appeared at A before L. In order to estimate how
number of concurrent connections affects the false-positive
rate, we make listener node L establish different number con-
current connections (1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20) to every peer in the
Bitcoin network. For each setting, we record 5,000 transac-
tions relayed byC, and examine how many of them are false
positives. We only discovered a total of 12 false positives
out of 30,000 transactions (which amounts for just 0.04%).
To better understand this result we further look at the trans-
action latency (i.e., the time between C creates a transaction
and node A receives it) under different transaction sizes and
region combinations, and find that in the majority of cases
client delay (see Section 2) dominates network latency. For
instance, even thoughC and A are in the same EC2 zone, the
longest transaction latency can be as long as 8.5 seconds.
Experiments in theMainnet. We now estimate true-positive
and false-positive rates in the Bitcoin Mainnet. We first
place client node C monitoring node A in the same region
(us-east-1) and carry out two experiments in which we
vary client’s entry nodes; we send 20 transactions from client
C in each of the experiments. The resulting true positive rate
is 65% and 40%. Next we place client C and node A in
different regions (us-east-1 and ap-northeast-1) and make
client C send 24 transactions. The true positive rate for this
case is 41.6%. These true-positive rates are very close to the
success rate we obtained earlier in the Testnet. We finally
estimate the false-positive rate. Out of 25000 transactions
only 20 arrived first at node A, which amounts to 0.08% only.
This proves that our method is a very reliable way to identify
transaction origins.
Discussion. Kaminsky was the first who described this gen-
eral idea in his BlackHat presentation [9] in the context of
client deanonymization, and Koshy et al. [10] was among
the first to try to practically evaluate it. While he was able to
deanonymize a number transactions that exposed anomalous
behavior (e.g. transactions relayed only once or transaction
that were relayed multiple times by the same IP), he con-
cludes that assigning a transaction’s ownership to its first
relayer is ineffective. Neudecker et al. [15] evaluate this
approach in the mainnet but only consider public reachable
peers. Compared to their results, we actually achieve much
better performance. We believe the discrepancy with our re-
sults is due to that we considered unreachable peers and lev-
ereaged the recent modifications to Bitcoin core software.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed an experimental framework
which we used to collect and analyze various statistics on
Bitcoin unreachable peers, a part of the Bitcoin network that
despite its size did not receive much attention from the re-
search community but which is crucial to enhance the scien-
tific understanding of the Bitcoin system.
In our study we deployed monitoring nodes spread over
the globe and collected more than two million connections
and transactions. We find several previously unreported and
surprising results. First, we find that Bitcoin unreachable
peers appear to be centralized: a large number of peer are
hosted in few Autonomous Systems. Second, the version
messages that we received from the clients as well their ISP’s
strongly suggest that the overwhelming majority of Bitcoin
users access Bitcoin through a mobile application. More-
over, we found that those peers are associated to two mobile
Bitcoin applications, which means that security of a large
number of transaction is in hands of just two companies.
Third, we discovered a large fraction of connections came
from public clouds; these might be used by researcher and
other interested parties to monitor and crawl the network.
We further experimentally evaluated a timing analysis-based
technique for triage the first relay that forwards a given trans-
action and our results suggest the technique can achieve near
zero false-positive rates against unreachable Bitcoin peers.
We believe that our work sheds more light into a more
hidden part of the Bitcoin network and is a valuable step to-
wards better understanding the Bitcoin ecosystem as a whole.
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